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URING THE COURSE OF 1998, the 350th Anniversary of the Peace of
Westphalia was celebrated in different European countries, and
throughout 1999 the Centennial of the First Hague Peace Conference repeat~
edly received solemn attention. l This article, written in honour of Professor
Leslie C. Green, will use the years of 1648 and 1899 as assessment points in re~
lation to developments in international law regarding the use of force by States.
As concerns the emerging law of collective security, the account will probe
somewhat beyond the year of 1899, but not beyond the establishment of the
League of Nations in 1920. The chosen topic is thus one oflegal historyj which
is not inappropriate when one takes into account the achievements of Leslie
Green; he himself became part of legal history through participation in war
treason trials in India after World War II, and he has written on international
humanitarian law and the UN Charter law on the use of force from both a his~
torical and contemporary perspective. The historical approach of this contri~
bution may be timely-at a juncture in international relations when the world
community is at a crossroads (as before in history) between multilateralism and
unilateralism, between global and regional decision making, and between the
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idealism of ambitious blueprints for the future 2 and laissez~faire oriented real~
ism.
The Peace of Westphalia and the Grotian Legacy
In October 1648, after 30 years of war and almost four years of negotiations,
two peace treaties were signed in the Westphalian cities of Osnabruck and
Munster. Most of the international actors of 17th~century Europe were repre~
sented at the peace congress: the Holy Roman Empire; nation~States like
France, Sweden, Spain, and Portugal; an emerging State, the Netherlands
(then called the United Provinces); the Holy See; i.e., the Swiss Confedera~
tion; Italian units such as Venice, Tuscany, and Savoy; and various German
principalities and bishoprics, etc} It was the first general peace congress in the
history of Europe. Among its immediate results were the introduction of a prin~
ciple of religious tolerance, the breakdown of medieval imperial and clerical
universalism, and the downgrading of the papacy to the status of a second~class
international actor. Moreover, in a longer term perspective, the peace contrib~
uted to the emergence of the modem international system of territorial and
sovereign States, a system where actors were (and are) maximizing their own
State interests, while at the same time striving for a balance of power.
From a legal point of view, the principle of national sovereignty was now in
the foreground, while at the same time restrictions in sovereign rights were rec~
ognized as a consequence of, inter alia, the Westphalian Peace Treaties.
Against a backdrop of natural law perceptions, nation~States, city~States, and
principalities alike perceived themselves as being part of a European collective
bound together by an emerging law of nations (jus inter gentes). The traditional
Roman concept of jus gentium survived, but took on a more State~oriented
meaning. International law, as we know it today, started to develop through
new (more efficient) forms of diplomacy, relying to a greater extent on perma~
nent missions and an increased registration of State practice.
Hugo Grotius died in 1645, but left behind4 a conception of an international
society which, at least in part, seemed to materialize after the Peace of
W estphalia. To some extent, this conception was realist in the sense that he
was aware of the importance of sovereignty, stressing that a sovereign State is a
power "whose actions are not subject to the legal control of another."5 More~
over, Grotius did not promote a doctrine of equality of States but rather recog~
nized power differences and legal relationships based on non~equality. 6 Yet the
conception was idealistic in the sense that, consistent with stoic doctrine, a so~
ciety of mankind, not one of States alone, was envisaged. 7 In this society, the
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individual possessed fundamental rights and freedoms and was not merely an
object. 8 It is possible to deduce from his thinking, as Hedley Bull has done, the
interpretation that Grotius was alluding to an international society of a more
advanced nature-an international community-which implied a vision of
"solidarism" and consensus in international relations. 9
As Bull himself and others have pointed out, Grotius said little or nothing
about crisis management, balance of power, great power responsibilities, international institutions, multilateral conferences, or collective suppression of aggression IO-in other words, nothing about collective security. Benedict
Kingsbury and Adam Roberts have noted that certain "solidarist" principles
are nevertheless discernible in his writings. They are, however, difficult to
concretize, a point made by Kingsbury.
Grotius' positions on such solidarist themes as the consequences of the justice or
injustice of a war ... and the enforcement ofIaw by third parties generally, are all
complex and often difficult to reduce to rules of decision. I I

In these areas, the treaties of Osnabriick and Miinster did, as we shall see,
carry things somewhat further and with greater clarity than the doctrines of
Grotius. His view of the law was "registrative" and backward-looking. He
wanted to remind his contemporaries of the nature of the existing legal system,
that it was almost as old as humanity itself and was "supposed to be as valid in
his time as it had been in Roman times."I2 As a consequence, Grotius' thinking
was not in full harmony with the Westphalian Peace regime, which was futureoriented and designed to expound a new legal order relating to the use of force
in Europe.
In De}ure Belli ac Pads, Grotius picked up the medieval and theological Just
War Doctrine and elaborated his own version of it. Although he circumscribed
the right to wage war to a number of instances in order to curb wars of conquest, his immediate legacy tended to be counterproductive to that purpose.
His basic bellum jus tum principle is reasonably clear: "war ought not to be undertaken except for the enforcement of rights." 13 Since Grotius wrote this at a
time when acts of violence for the enforcement of rights occurred between actors other than States, such as families, cities, and corporations, and since he
was not ready to exclude such bellum privatum from the legal sphere, but rather
draw analogies from it with regard to inter-State relations, his position could be
described as admissive vis-a.-vis the use of force generally. However, at the
same time he tried to introduce, de lege ferenda, a State monopoly on the use of
force, for he perceived it to be conducive to law and order.
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When Grotius listed the legitimate reasons for resorting to use of force, he
deduced them from a citizen's reasons for commencing a law suit. 14 Any denial
of existing rights would justify a victimized State's reaction with military force.
For example, force could be used for the recovery of lost property or the repair
of economic damage. This position meant that Grotius' jus ad bellum doctrine
(like other jus ad bellum doctrines) included first use of force as a natural element. It also included second use reactions to other States' use of force.
Grotius' view on self-defence in fact foreshadows the Caroline case. He only admitted preventive action if it was "necessary" and in response to an immediate
threat where one was "certain" about the intentions of the opponent. Arguing
somewhat loosely, he asserted that "the degree of certainty required is that
which is accepted in morals."IS
Morality also played a role in Grotius' view on punitive actions. Punishment
was a just cause in response to injustice done to oneself or third States. There
was a general right of participation in a just war. Moreover, Grotius recognized
the justness of a war "against men who act like beasts,"16 and thus came close to
what today is called humanitarian intervention. He based his "just causes" on
natural law and the voluntary or positive law of nations (agreements and
practice).
The just causes of Grotian doctrine can be summarized as follows:
• recovery of what is legally due to an aggrieved State;
• territorial defence against an attack, actual or threatening, but not
against a potential threat;
• economic defence to protect one's property; and
• the infliction of punishment upon a wrongdoing State. 17
Wars waged without any cause were "unjust," a categorization that entailed
certain practical consequences. One was to assume relevance for later legal developments, namely Grotius' doctrine on qualified neutrality. Absolute impartiality was impossible in relation to the aggressor and his opponent. In Book III
of De Jure Belli ac Pacis, Grotius wrote that neutrals should do nothing to support the "wicked case" or hamper "him who wages a just war."18 There was no
suggestion of a duty to assist actively the "just side," but Grotius asserted that
the right of passage ought to be granted to the party fighting for a just cause and
denied to one motivated by an unjust cause. 19 However, Grotius did not envisage collective action on the part of the international society. His doctrines expressed a "law of coexistence," not a "law of co-operation" (to use Wolfgang
Friedmann's terminology). 20 This does not exclude perceptions of "the Grotian
image of war as a fight for the common good," as Michael Donelan would argue, or fighting for a just cause "on behalf of the community as a whole," as
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Hedley Bull would put it. Z1 Nevertheless, this "solidarist" theme is more pro~
nounced in the provisions of the Westphalian Peace regime.
The Treaty of Munster contains three articles of relevance in this context.
First, Article I stated:
That there shall be a Christian and Universal Peace, and a perpetual, true, and
sincere Amity, between his Sacred Imperial Majesty, and his most Christian
Majesty; as also, between all and each of the Allies, ... That this Peace and
Amity be observed and cultivated with such a Sincerity and Zeal, that each Party
shall endeavour to procure the Benefit, Honour and Advantage of the other; etc .
• • .2Z
That this general pronouncement on maintenance of peace also amounted
to an international obligation to solve existing disputes by peaceful means was
made clear by the 123rd Article of the Treaty. Even if violations of the Treaty
should occur
... The Offended shall before all things exhort the Offender not to come to any
Hostility, submitting the Cause to a friendly Composition, or the ordinary
Proceedings oflustice.23
These provisions were, in a sense, forerunners to Articles 12, 13 and 15 of
the Covenant of the League of Nations (on certain procedures for crisis man~
agement) and Articles 2(3) and 33 of the UN Charter (on obligatory peaceful
settlement of disputes).
In fact, the Peace of Westphalia contained an embryo of what later would be
called collective security. The Article quoted above also obliged the parties
(individually) "to defend and protect all and every Article of this Peace against
anyone, without distinction of Religion." This obligation was supplemented by
a rule on collective sanctions in the following (124th) Article:
[I] f for the space of three years the Difference cannot be terminated by anyone of
those [peaceful] means, all and every one of those concerned in this Transaction
shall be obliged to join the injured Party, and assist him with Counsel and Force
to repel the Injury ... and the Contravener shall be regarded as an Infringer of
the Peace.24

Thus, there was an obligation to identify the aggressor and join forces to repel
the aggression. This Westphalian formula on a mutual guarantee of security to
be triggered after the failure of peaceful settlement efforts would influence later
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State practice and can today be compared with Articles 10 and 16 of the
League Covenant and Chapters VI and VII of the UN Charter.
Grotius' jus ad bellum doctrine was not reflected in the Peace provisions. The
more ambitious approach of jus contra bellum was introduced in State (treaty)
practice for the first time (although in a loose manner). It would not prevail in
actual practice during the following centuries, but after 1648 it was once and
for all ideologically implanted in political thinking on law and diplomacy.
It is definitely an overstatement to say, as Hedley Bull has done, that Grotius
"may be considered the intellectual father of this first general peace settlement
of modem times."25 Grotius did not recommend a general conference of Euro,
pean powers and did not envisage that a comprehensive peace settlement
would have the potential of providing the international society with an institu,
tional foundation. However, Grotius' conception of international society is
bound to have influenced the negotiators in Osnabruck and Munster to some
extent. Hedley Bull may be correct in his assessment that "in their impact on
the course of international history the theory of Grotius and the practice of
Westphalia marched together."26
The Westphalian Balance of Power System 1648-1789
In the immediate aftermath of 1648, it seemed that the old international sys,
tern had been transformed into an international society, if not into an interna,
tional community guided by common values, common policy prescriptions,
and common legal rules of coexistence. Nevertheless, the weakness of the
Westphalian peace and security system soon became apparent. In modem par'
lance, it had no institutional backing and contained no mechanism for imple,
menting crisis management procedures. Moreover, there was more often than
not a lack of political will in the ensuing era of absolutism. Non,peaceful settle,
ment of disputes seemed to be the rule. The first trade war between the Nether,
lands and Britain was fought between 1652-54. During the same decade,
Spanish troops recaptured Barcelona from French occupation, Sweden inter,
vened in the Polish, Russian war, Denmark attacked Sweden's territories in
northern Germany, Britain and France jointly attacked Spain, etc. However,
the area of main concern to the Westphalian Peace negotiators, central Eu,
rope, was still peaceful.
Westphalia left a legacy of balance of power diplomacy that in many respects
was conducive to peace. Although the treaties of Osnabruck and Munster con,
tained no explicit wording on balance of power, the concept was inherent in
the treaties. The rule on collective sanctions implied a potential of deterrence
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that could curb aggressive tendencies in balance-threatening situations. Moreover, a form of collective self-defence materialized in 1663 and 1683 when
Turkish troops threatened Vienna (and the Habsburg Empire), but were repelled through the collective efforts of countries (France and others) that came
to Austria's assistance. The perception of a threat posed by a strong Islamic
presence in central Europe was enough to cause various powers to join forces
(in all probability, irrespective of the Munster Treaty).
When the European balance of power system was threatened again in 1688,
a coalition against the peace-breaker was forged soon enough. This time the
expansionist policy of Louis XIV had manifested itself in a French invasion of
the Palatinate (Pfalz). In this and similar cases, most States wanted to preserve
some basic status quo as a way to prevent other States from gaining a position of
dominance. Balance of power diplomacy was thus directed more towards limiting the political/territorial consequences of war than towards abolishing war as
such. The (anti-French) coalition war ended with the Peace of Rijswijk in
1697, where Louis XIV had to give up most of the conquered territories and accept arbitration on numerous territorial claims. The jus contra bellum element
of the Westphalian heritage had been diluted beyond recognition in actual
practice, but traces of it remained in peace treaties for years to come.
Louis XIV threatened the balance of power once again in 1700 when he advanced a claim on the Spanish throne on behalf of his grandson. This led to a
new anti-French coalition being formed the following year27 and to the outbreak of the War of the Spanish Succession (1701-1714), which ended in
French defeat. The balance of power was upheld through the peace treaties of
Utrecht (1713) and Rastatt (1714). The Peace of Utrecht consisted of a number of bilateral agreements which explicitly confirmed what in Westphalia had
been a general understanding-that peace had to be built on a just geopolitical
equilibrium (jus tum potentiae equilibrium) .28 In this sense the treaties of Utrecht
reconfirmed a Westphalian tradition. However, since France was successful in
"bilateralizing" the peace conditions in relation to its different adversaries, the
Peace of Utrecht did not mark the existence of an international society or community in the same way as the Peace of Westphalia had done. The Westphalian embryo of collective security was not taken up further. Although
Europe had raised a coalition of the willing against the peace-breaker, no obligations as to collective action or sanctions were envisaged for the future. Louis
XIV had been forced to respect the European balance, but the powers upholding it could neither impose an efficient status quo nor secure peaceful change in
the relations ofStates.29 Utrecht did not reconfirm the Westphalian principle
of European public law requiring peaceful settlement of disputes. The
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embryonic element of jus contra bellum was not revived; the doctrine of jus ad
bellum prevailed.
In 1699 Denmark, Poland and Russia formed an aggressive alliance against
Sweden, their plan being to launch simultaneous attacks the following year. As
a consequence, the Great Northern War (1700-1721) was unleashed, during
which Charles XII of Sweden rejected several peace offers. During the war, the
1712 edition of Grotius' De]ure Belli ac Pads was translated into Russian, and
inspired the Russian diplomat P.P. Shafirov to defend Peter the Great's
first~use~of~force against Sweden. In 1717 Shafirov published A Discourse Con~
ceming the lust Causes of War Between Sweden and Russia (as it was called in the
later English version)}O Voltaire, who did not believe that Grotius had influ~
enced anything regarding the restraint of war, ironically rejected (in his book
on Charles XII) the just causes advanced by Russian diplomacy during the
Northern War}1 Under the Peace of Nystad (1721), Sweden lost her Baltic
provinces and Russia emerged as a major coastal State in the region and as a
new Great Power. The northern balance had shifted to a new equilibrium.
In the discourse of international lawyers there have been different views on
the matter of balance of power as it relates to the law on war and peace. Some
have (since the 18th century) seen the balancing system as a precondition of in~
ternationallaw, others have viewed it as a peace~oriented policy of preserving
the status quo, a few may have understood its preservation as amounting to a
legal obligation on the part of States, and many have considered it a formula
giving rise to legal rights of intervention and resort to force}Z The legal
consequences of the 18th century political r~alities amounted inter alia to an ex~
tensive interpretation of the law of individual and collective self~defence, al~
though Grotius had not included preventive war among his categories of bellum
jus tum. Christian Wolff, writing in 1749, thought that the balance of power was
"useful to protect the common security." He did not believe that "the preserva~
tion of equilibrium" was in itself a just cause of war, but he nevertheless found
that nations under threat of subjugation had the right to resort to force. 33
Wolffs disciple, Emmerich de Vattel, rejected conquest, property claims,
and religious differences as just causes of war, but admitted that in order to protect their interests, States had a right to resort to war in response to what they
regarded as injuries. As a consequence of this "realist" approach, Vattel's book,
Le Droit des gens (first edition 1758) became very popular in government chancelleries and diplomatic circles. Vattel did not, however, completely accept the
so-called probabilist doctrine (embraced by Wolff and others before him) that
war could be just on both sides since "probable reasons" for legality could be offered in the concrete case. Vattel maintained that it was impossible that two
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contrary claims were simultaneously true, although both parties to a conflict
could act bona fide and accusations of unjustness should be avoided in such situations. Nevertheless, he rejected all suggestions that the end justifies the
means and that might is right. He recognized the need for collective action
against aggressors that upset the balance of power. The common safety of the
society of nations would permit joint action to restrain and punish rogue
States. 34
While Wolff and Vattel were busy authoring their volumes on "the law of
nations," the international scene around them was characterized by power politics. In 1740 Frederick the Great of Prussia embarked upon the Austrian War
of Succession, from which Prussia emerged in 1748 as a new Great Power.
Again the balance of power had shifted. Other wars followed: the Seven Year
War (1756-63) and the Bavarian War of Succession (1778-79). Although during this era an unprovoked attack was regarded as immoral behaviour, a war of
aggression was not necessarily looked upon as illegal under the public law of
Europe or the law of nations. The Articles of the Treaty of Munster, indicating
the contrary, had yielded to what Schwarzenberger has called the Grotian
"elasticity of just causes of resort to war."35 In retrospect it could be argued that
Grotius' jus ad bellum doctrine had served to license war rather than to restrict
it. One of Grotius' purposes was to curb wars of conquest. Sharon Korman has
made the point in a recent thesis that Prussia's conquest of Silesia (1740) and
the three partitions of Poland (1772, 1793, 1795) were accepted by the European States and thereby confirmed the existence of a right of conquest.3 6 At
the time, balance of power arguments were used to legitimize both the conquest ofSilesia and the enforced partitions of Poland. The Westphalian Peace
concept (where the balance of power ideology was linked to the non-use of
force) had vanished from State practice, but it survived in different variants in
political and philosophical literature.
Elements of Jus contra Bellum in Political Philosophy 1713-1806
During the negotiations leading up to the Peace of Utrecht, the French
Abbe de Saint-Pierre served as a secretary to the French delegation and, in his
spare time, elaborated a peace plan for Europe. It first appeared in 1712 as
Projet de la Paix Universelle. The following year a more extended version under
the less ambitious title Projet pour rendre la Paix perpituelle en Europe was published. Saint-Pierre may have been influenced by the Quaker William Penn's
booklet, Essays Towards the Present and Future Peace of Europe (1693), in which
Penn put forward the idea of a federation of European States (including Russia
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and Turkey) as a peace maintenance mechanism. Saint' Pierre advocated a fed~
eration of European/Christian States based on the post,Utrecht status quo. He
saw the proposed federal structure as a way to prevent international and inter~
nal armed conflict. Disputes would be resolved by peaceful means, i.e., by arbi~
tration or judicial process within the framework of a permanent assembly of
State representatives. The Assembly (or Senate) would function under the
leadership of the existing major powers. These States would possess more votes
than others under the decision,making procedure. Common decisions on en~
forcement measures could be taken to uphold the status quo or implement the
desired ord~r. War as a means of coercion, on the part of the Federation, was
envisaged as the ultimate sanction against recalcitrant States}7 In this respect,
Saint,Pierre's thinking was part of a Westphalian heritage of collective secu,
rity. His peace project included an important element of jus contra bellum, not
in the strict and direct UN Charter "Article 2(4) sense," but in the broader and
more general perspective that will always be intertwined with any peace plan
for common or collective security.
Saint,Pierre's ideas became well known in Europe and they were com,
mented upon by Frederick the Great, Voltaire, Rousseau and others-aI,
though often in a sceptical or even ironic fashion. Rousseau abridged and
reviewed his project in an essay-Extrait du projet de paix perpetuelle d. M. l'Abbi
de St. Pierre (1760)-and has, therefore (at times), been perceived as a strong
supporter of Saint Pierre and his peace plan. In fact, Rousseau thought it naive,
but applauded Saint,Pierre's aspirations.
Montesquieu, in De l'Esprit des lois (1748), came close to embracing the
stricter jus contra bellum approach when he rejected the right of conquest (ex,
cept as a matter of self, defence) and advocated the principles that "nations,
without prejudicing their true interests, in time of peace ought to do one an,
other all good they can, and in time of war, as little injury as possible."38 The
former proposition would today include the peaceful settlement obligation of
Articles 2(3) and 33 of the UN Charter, while the latter would refer to the prin~
ciples underlying the international humanitarian law of armed conflict. Mon,
tesquieu's views on natural law in this respect supplements this proposition. In
arguing against Thomas Hobbes' thesis of men by nature being in a state of war,
he claimed that "peace would be the first law of nature."39
In the 1780's, Jeremy Bentham crafted a peace project-"Plan for a Univer,
sal and Perpetual Peace"-but it was not published until after his death in the
volume Principles of International Law (1843) and thus could hot exert any in,
fluence during the period under consideration. In it, Bentham criticized Vattel
and other naturalists. He aimed at a codification of international law that
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would rule out war and colonization and rely on public opinion as a"sanction for
peace.
The French Revolution conveyed an ideology which had important implica~
tions for the development of certain international legal concepts. Internal free~
dom (civil and political rights) was seen as a condition for peace and the
competence to wage war ought to, in accord with this perception, be placed un~
der the authority of the representatives of the people. The idea was advanced
that "all unjust aggression" was contrary to natural law. War should only be
used to repress a grave injustice and conquest should be forbidden. A constitu~
tiona I proposal by Mirabeau provided that if the legislative assembly found a
minister or other executive agent guilty of international aggression, he would
be punished for criminal acts against the State.40 The ensuing Decree of the
National Assembly of May 22, 1790, was not that far~reaching, but did contain
a rejection of wars of conquest, and its text was later incorporated in the Revolutionary Constitution. The 1791 Constitution included the following formula:
The French Nation renounces the undertaking of any war with a view to
making conquests and will never use its forces against the liberty of any
people. 41

A follow-up Decree of April 13, 1793, pronounced the principle of
non~intervention in the affairs of other States. These revolutionary concep~
tions also found expression in the Declaration du droit des gens, which in 1795
was submitted to the French Convention by o"ne of its members, Abbe
Gregoire. It was intended as a corollary to the Declaration des droits de l'homme
of 1789, a parallelism inspired by 18th century natural law thinking. The new
(draft) declaration contained a number oflofty principles, including the proposition that an armed attack by one nation upon the liberty of another would be
an offense against all nations, and the principle that the interests of individual
nations should be subordinated to the "general interests of the human race."42
The Declaration was not adopted.
Edmund Burke's well~known condemnation of the French Revolution was
linked to his concern about the future of the balance of power in Europe. With
the outbreak of the Revolution, Westphalia had become "an antiquated fable,"
he wrote in 1791.43 Any attempt to upset the European balance of power system was for Burke a just cause of war. There was a duty to intervene in the in~
ternal affairs of France in order to protect "the public laws of Europe."
When Thomas Paine published Part II of his Rights of Man, Being an Answer
to Mr Burke's Attack on the French Revolution in 1792, he also opposed Burke's
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view on war. Instead of finding a "public law of Europe," Paine noted the
"uncivilized state of European governments" and the fact that those govern,
ments were "almost continually at war."44 He denounced war as such as harm'
ful to the "principles of commerce and its universal operation" and made the
point that commercial development is dependant on the maintenance of
peace. Thus, it was in everyone's interest to avoid war. 45 Paine was here to
some extent foreshadowing the plans of Robert Schumann and Jean Monnet
for a European Community. He did not, however, draw any legal conclusions
from this reasoning, other than that he implicitly denied a jus ad bellum based
on an alleged public law of Europe.
When Immanuel Kant published his famous essay Zum ewigen Frieden in
1795, he argued, like Paine, that "the spirit of trade ca~not coexist with war, and
sooner or later this spirit dominates every people. For among all those powers
(or means) that belong to a nation, financial power may be the most reliable in
forcing nations to pursue the noble cause of peace."46
Kant was critical of Grotius, Vattel, and other naturalists and their pre ten'
sion of stating a valid legal prohibition against certain uses of force. Thus, he
denied any lex lata on the subject (although he did not put it in these terms). He
noted, however, a "dormant moral aptitude to master the evil principle in him'
self" and claimed that "from the throne of its moral legislative power, reason
[emphasis added] absolutely condemns war as a means of determining the right
and makes seeking the state of peace a matter of unmitigated duty."47 He
tnereafter embarked upon an idealistic reasoning de lege ferenda:
But without a contract among nations peace can be neither inaugurated nor
guaranteed. A league of a special sort must therefore be established, one that we
can call a league of peace (foedus pacificum), which will be distinguished from a
treaty of peace (pactum pacis) because the latter seeks merely to stop one war,
while the former seeks to end all wars forever. This league does not seek any
power of the sort possessed by nations, but only the maintenance and security of
each nation's freedom, as well as that of the other nations leagued with it, ... "48

Although accepting the decentralized Westphalian State system of equal
nations, Kant wanted to improve upon it through agreement. His proposal
amounted to a loose federation of free nations, without any supranational
mechanisms for collective sanctions (not to erode national sovereignty), but
kept together by the moral force ofleading States. He was not aiming for a uni,
versal world State but a universal moral order. This could be achieved by one or
two States inspiring others to join in a federation:
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It can be shown that this idea of federalism should eventually include all nations
and thus lead to perpetual peace. For if good fortune should so dispose matters
that a powerful and enlightened people should form a republic (which by its
nature must be inclined to seek perpetual peace), it will provide a focal point for a
federal association among other nations that will join in order to guarantee a
state of peace ... , and through several associations of this sort such a federation
can extend further and further. 49
As indicated above, Kant did not (in Zum ewigen Frieden) support a collec~
tive security system based on enforcement or sanctions. In an essay published
two years earlier, he had written:
But it will be said that nations will never subject themselves to such coercive
laws; and the proposal for a universal cosmopolitan nation, to whose power all
individual nations should voluntarily submit, and whose laws they should obey,
may sound ever so nice in the theory of the Abbe St. Pierre or of a Rousseau, yet
it is of no practical use. For this proposal has always been ridiculed by great
statesmen, and even more by leaders of nations, as a pedantically childish
academic idea. 50
A modem reading of Kant would confirm key~words/concepts like national
sovereignty, international agreement, constitutional basis, peaceful settlement
of disputes, non~use of force, non~intervention, the right to self~defence, and
national self~determination (Kant opposed colonization).51 All in all, his jus
contra bellum approach was reasonably modem.
The Westphalian tradition would include concepts like peaceful coexis~
tence, equality of sovereign States, peaceful settlement of disputes, non~use of
force, balance of power, mutual security guarantees, and collective sanctions.
One or more of these concepts have on and off appeared in the State practice
or doctrine touched upon so far.
When, during the Napoleonic Wars, the Austrian statesman Friedrich von
Gentz published Fragmente aus den neuesten Geschichte des Politischen
Gleichgewichts in Europa (1806), he singled out some of these Westphalian con~
cepts: balance of power, equality of States, peaceful coexistence, and joint ac~
tion against peace breakers. He was, of course, heavily influenced by
Napoleon's upheaval of the traditional European balance and wanted to see
the feature of national self~determination reestablished on the European conti~
nent. As a consequence, von Gentz supported normative development towards
a prohibition of first use of force in the relations between States, but, in light of
his later association with Metternich and the post~ 1815 doctrine of armed
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intervention against revolutionary movements in other States, his
ment to a genuine jus contra bellum approach can be doubted.

commit~

The Concert of Europe and European Peace Diplomacy 1815-1897
Revolutionary France, in spite of its "peace~loving" constitution, hurled it~
self into an armed conflict with the rest of continental Europe in 1792. Follow~
ing Napoleon's ascendancy to power a few years later, the European balance
was threatened anew. In 1804, Alexander I of Russia presented a peace plan for
a European order after the expected fall of Napoleon. As with the Peace of
Westphalia, the new peace was to be guaranteed by articulation of rules for the
behaviour of and relations between States laid down in treaty form. Every State
would pledge not to start a war without first having exhausted all available
means for a peaceful solution of the dispute. Acceptance of mediation would be
the rule. A State that violated these norms risked facing the joint armed forces
of the European powers. This initiative from St. Petersburg was, however, not
politically credible and was soon eroded by the capriciousness of the Czar.
A more promising initiative of a less ambitious nature was taken by the Brit~
ish foreign minister, Lord Castlereagh, at the Congress of Vienna in 1815,
when he proposed a Final Declaration of the Congress in which States would
oblige themselves to strengthen and maintain the dearly~bought peace. The re~
suit was a Proclamation, adopted on March 13,1815, consisting of a pledge by
the eight peace~concluding parties to protect the peace, in particular against
revolutionary upheavals. It seemed that political status quo was more important
than protection of the peace as such.
The decade following the Congress of Vienna was characterized by Great
Power initiatives for management of international affairs. First, Czar Alexan~
der initiated the Holy Alliance with its religious overtones, and thereafter Furst
Metternich started to orchestrate a European military preparedness to preserve
the "legitimate" position of existing governments. The Concert of Europe
brought with it a form of political cooperation that was unprecedented in the
history of the continent. The emphasis was on common security, rather than
on non~use of force. Lord Castlereagh had said in Parliament in May 1815, ap~
ropos of the need for reassurances against a revitalized France, that
... in order to render this security as complete as possible, it seems necessary, at
the point of a general Pacification, to form a Treaty to which all the principal
Powers of Europe should be Parties, fixed and recognized, and they should all
bind themselves mutually to protect and support each other, against any attempt
to infringe them. 52
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On making the statement, Lord Castlereagh noted that he desired a treaty
which would "reestablish a general and comprehensive system of Public Law in
Europe." It was jus contra bellum, but primarily in the collective security sense.
First use of force mandated by the Powers was not excluded.
The balance of power was monitored through consultations at international
conferences: Vienna 1815; Aix,la,Chapelle (Aachen) 1818; Troppau (Opava)
1820; Laibach (Ljublana) 1821; and Verona 1822. The conference majority in
Troppau agreed upon a legitimization of intervention in the affairs of other
States (where the current political order was threatened), although British di,
plomacy had resisted and done its best to prevent this development. When
Austria under Metternich intervened against the revolutionaries in Naples in
1820, Britain objected. Three years later, when France intervened against the
liberal insurgents in Spain, Britain objected again.
Conference diplomacy took a more constructive turn in 1830 when the risk
that France and Prussia would intervene on either side of the Belgian uprising
against the Dutch supremacy surfaced. In order to maintain European peace
and security, a diplomatic conference was convened in London. Under the
leadership of Lord Palmers ton, a process of crisis management was initiated,
one which yielded concrete results; Belgian independence was recognized in
1830 and Belgian neutrality in 1831. When the Netherlands attempted to
undo the results of the conference through armed force, Britain and France in'
tervened militarily and secured the conference solution.
It is often said that the Congress system and the European Concert broke
down after a relatively short time, but in the mind of many political participants
during the latter part of the century (e.g., William Gladstone) the European
Concert retained its relevance as an ideological project. The important thing,
from a historical point of view, is the observation that conference diplomacy as
a phenomenon was there to stay. The fact that this diplomacy, if not preven,
tive, at least was crisis management oriented, is of relevance for the history of
the law of collective security. However, it is of limited importance for our
theme of jus contra bellum developments.
The Ministerial Congresses and the Diplomatic Conferences of the time
were reactive, not proactive, as regards interstate use of force. With the excep,
tion of treaties on neutralization of small areas, international negotiations were
not concerned with normative blueprints in order to forestall aggression and
other uses of force; rather, they were concerned with crisis management after
the outbreak of war. This is true for the 1841 Turkish Straits Agreement (con'
cluded between the five Great Powers and Turkey), the 1850 London Peace
Agreement after the first Schleswig,Holstein War (between Prussia and
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Denmark), the 1856 Peace Conference of Paris after the Crimean War, the
1878 Congress of Berlin after the Russian~Turkish War, and the 1897 Great
Power mediation after the Greek~Turkish War.
It should be noted, however, that the 1856 peace settlement of Paris in~
cluded one element of jus contra bellum. The specially adopted Declaration of
Maritime Law prohibited States from licensing piracy through the following
text: "Privateering is, and remains, abolished." The prohibition was applicable
in armed conflict, and-one would presume-in peacetime as well.
One of the frequent London Conferences was not a reaction to an outbreak
of war, but an attempt to avert such an outbreak. During the crisis of 1867 over
Luxemburg (which Bismarck was not prepared to let Napoleon III purchase
from the Netherlands), British diplomacy engineered the solution of an inde~
pendent and neutralized principality of Luxemburg. A war between Prussia and
France may have been prevented in the process.
Still, a number of wars of aggression occurred during this period, indicating
the prevalence of Clausewitz's thinking that war is an extension of national
policy. The concept of jus ad bellum did not seem to imply any restrictions on
the sovereign decision~making power of nations. Troops of the German Con,
federation invaded parts of Denmark in 1848, Prussian~Austrian troops re~
peated this in 1864 (and conquered Schleswig-Holstein), and Prussia
embarked upon a war with its former ally Austria in 1866.
In July 1870, Bismarck had managed to provoke France into declaring war
on Prussia. "The German nation ... is the victim of aggression" declared a representative of the German Social Democratic Workers Party.53 Karl Marx saw
the war on the German side as one of self~defence. But in September 1870, the
war of territorial self-defence was over and German troops were fighting for ter~
ritorial expansion in Alsace, Lorraine. Karl Marx, in his Second Address of the
International, described the war after Sedan "as an act of aggression" against the
territorial integrity of France and against the people of Alsace~ Lorraine. Marx
was hovering between the poles of justifiability (self-defence) and
non-justifiability (aggression), between perceived legality and illegality. As Mi~
chael Walzer has pointed out, he was "working within the terms set by the the~
ory of aggression."54
At about this time, public opinion was in tune with an emerging opinio juris
(within rather than between States) that aggression was a crime under internationallaw. Public opinion also greeted the news of the Alabama Claims arbitration in 1872. A serious dispute between two major powers had been settled
through peaceful means, an occurrence which thereby indicated an alternative
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to armed conflict. Expectations de lege ferenda pointed towards a future legal re~
gime of obligatory settlement procedures, towards a jus contra bellum.
This was a time when the peace movement was on the move again, after a
period of decline following the nationalistic sentiments of the Crimean War.
The outlawing of war had been on the agenda since the first peace conferences
were held in New York, London, Paris, and Geneva between 1815-1830. The
first international Peace Congress was held in London in 1843, and in 1867
Victor Hugo and Giuseppe Garibaldi founded the first peace~oriented NGO
-Ligue de la Paix et de la Liberte-in Geneva. In the aftermath of the judicial
settlement of the Alabama Claims, international lawyers became active and
founded two peace~oriented organisations of their own in 1873: first, the
Institut de Droit International in Gent; and thereafter the Association for the
Reform and Codification of the Law of Nations (later International Law Asso~
ciation) in Brussels.
In 1888, the Interparliamentary Union was founded in order to unite parlia~
mentarians in a struggle against war, and the following year the first World
Peace Conference was convened with representatives from different national
peace associations. Both events took place in Paris. In 1889 the Austrian bar~
oness Bertha von Suttner published the best~selling novel Down with Arms (Die
Waffen nieder). Her friend, Alfred Nobel, died in 1896 (he had been active in
his way for the cause of peace) and left behind a will that, inter alia, resulted in
the Nobel Peace Prize. All this private activity may have influenced individual
statesmen, politicians and diplomats, but it did not result in any normative pro~
posals sponsored by governments. All the same, a political principle of
non~aggression had emerged in conformity with the opinion of many actors in
national societies.
Emphasis in the international society remained on ad hoc crisis~management.
In 1897, when Greece wanted to liberate Crete for reasons of nationalistic ful~
filment (enos is) power rather than international morality, it was warned by the
Great Powers not to attack Turkey. Notwithstanding the warnings, Greece
sent a fleet to Crete and mounted operations in Thrace. It has been said that
the six Great Powers (Britain, France, Germany, Austria, Russia, and Italy)
"laid down the rules of the game-for instance, that the aggressor would not be
allowed to obtain any advantage from the conflict, whatever the result might
be."55 One gets an impression of an emerging opinio juris corresponding to the
principle ex injuria jus non oritur. But it is probably too much to say that the in~
ternationallaw on the use of force was developed through State practice at this
instant. Nevertheless, international law thinking seemed to have played a cer~
tain part in the crisis management. Greece started the war, lost it, was saved by
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international mediation, and thereafter put under international administrative
control not only for reasons of economic necessity but also in order to secure
the payment of war compensation to Turkey under the peace agreement. The
principles of non~aggression and pacta sunt servanda were important for reasons
of balance of power.
The turn of the century was close. Although nothing indicated any substan~
tiallegal developments in the near future, in fact, the road of diplomacy had
been paved for a new turn in the area of international law and organization.
The Hague Peace Conference of 1899 and Beyond
When the heads of the various diplomatic missions in St. Petersburg at~
tended the weekly reception of the Russian foreign minister, Count
Mouravieff, on August 24, 1898, they were in for a surprise. Mouravieff pre~
sented a manifesto of the Czar amounting to an invitation to an International
Peace Conference to discuss the most effective means of assuring a lasting
peace and a reduction of excessive armaments. The diplomats realized that no
government could express anything else than sympathy for such a proposal, but
they also realized that no major States could be expected to agree on any disar~
mament proposals, since preservation of freedom of action was considered vital
in this context. A circular was sent out to the different capitals and replies were
requested. At a later stage, Mouravieff travelled around in Europe and assured
chancelleries that the conference should not discuss disarmament proper-that
would be utopian-but try to find limits for the arms race (arms control). The
reason behind the initiative, many believed, was Russia's financial situation.
The finance minister, Count Witte, was said to refuse to assign the funds nec~
essary for the introduction of new weapons (Russia needed to match the
rapid~firing field artillery of Germany) and Witte was perceived as the driving
force behind the idea of an international agreement on limitation of arma~
ments in order to save costs.
Reactions to the invitation-included suggestions on the need for adoption of
rules for settlement of international disputes by arbitration. A new circular of
January 11, 1899, enumerated eight items which could usefully be discussed at
the Conference. In the terminology of today, items 1-4 concerned arms con~
trol, items 5-7 international humanitarian law of armed conflict, and item 8 ar~
bitration. Representatives of the peace movement disliked many of the first
seven items, since "war should be abolished, not alleviated." Already at this
preparatory stage, there was a shift of emphasis from the issue of modern weap~
ons developments to the Westphalian concepts of peaceful settlement of
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disputes and equality of States, concepts which were strongly supported by
smaller States and the peace movement, It is unlikely that these attitudes were
directly influenced by the European history of political ideas, but they never~
the less belonged to the Westphalian peace tradition,
The new circular of January 1899 also touched upon the venue of the Con~
ference. The Czar was no longer considering St. Petersburg and thought it
better to avoid any of the Great Power capitals. In diplomatic circles this was
seen as damage limitation, a consequence of the less than encouraging reac~
tions of the major powers. Change of venue would minimize disgrace if the
Czar's initiative should fail. Preparations soon focused on a "neutral" capital,
with the Hague finally chosen as the site for the Conference.
When the Conference opened on May 18, 1899, representatives of26 States
were present. Europe dominated with 20 delegations, including Turkey. Other
participating nations were the United States, China, Japan, Persia, Siam, and
Mexico.
Delegations were composed of seasoned diplomats, military and naval men,
and "technical experts." The latter group included experts in international law,
such as the Russian professor Fjodor de Martens, a proponent of arbitration
and humanitarian law of armed conflict and soon to be famous for the
"Martens' Clause" (adopted in its first version in 1899). The British delegation
included Sir Julian Pauncefote, the Ambassador in Washington who was well
known for his work in 1897 on an (abortive) arbitration treaty with the United
States. The U.S. delegation included Andrew D. White, Ambassador in Berlin,
who, like Martens and Pauncefote, was a firm believer in the peaceful settle~
ment of disputes. However, most of the military and naval delegates from the
major powers seemed to be of the opinion that "might is right."
The Conference was also followed by enthusiastic activists of the peace
movement, like the British journalist William T. Stead, the Russian author and
industrialist Ivan Bloch, Bertha von Suttner, and others. The popular demand
for arbitration had to be taken seriously by politicians. The general atmosphere
of Hague 1899, outside the conference rooms in the Royal summer palace, was
filled with optimism and expectations. Delegates, for reasons of self~esteem,
found themselves slowly trying to respond constructively to these expectations.56
The arms control proposals were soon shelved, not to be taken up seriously
again, but the second Committee that dealt with the jus in bello under Martens'
chairmanship achieved some useful results [the Convention with Respect to
the Laws and Customs of War on Land, its Annex of Regulations on Land
Warfare, the Convention for the Adaptation to Maritime Warfare of the Prin~
ciples of the 1864 Geneva Convention, and the Declarations concerning
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Asphyxiating Gases and Expanding ("dum~dum") Bullets].57 But ultimately
the work of the Conference centred on the third Committee and the proposal
for a permanent court of arbitration.
The initial objective was to make arbitration compulsory in disputes of a less
important nature, namely those which did not affect "vital national interests."
In the end, after German recalcitrance, the idea of compulsory arbitration was
completely abandoned, although a permanent body (the Permanent Court of
Arbitration) was established through the agreed~upon Convention for the Pa~
cific Settlement ofInternational Disputes. Article 1 of the Convention, signed
on July 29, 1899, stipulates:
With a view to obviating, as far as possible, recourse to force in the relations
between States, the Signatory Powers agree to use their best efforts to ensure the
pacific settlement of international differences. 58

This non~obligatory wording leaves it to the parties of a dispute to find ways
and means of solving their differences. There is no binding renunciation of the
use of force, merely a declared intention to avoid resorting to force "as far as
possible."
Article 2 deals with good offices and mediation. Here the contracting parties
agree, "before [they chose] an appeal to arms," to have recourse to such proce~
dures, but only "as far as circumstances permit."
Articles 15-57 lay down the system for international arbitration and Articles
20-29 concern '.'the Permanent Court" (consisting of an International Bureau,
which serves as a record office, and a list of Arbitrators/Members of the Court).
Arbitral procedure is set forth in Articles 30-57 and Article 56 makes clear that
an award "is only binding on the parties who concluded the [specially regu~
lated] 'Compromis'." Despite all the deferences to national sovereignty and
State consent, the Convention represented considerable progress at its adop~
tion. Since Westphalia, it was the first step taken in international law to place
legal restrictions up.on the right of States to resort to war as an instrument of
national policy. It was ajus contra bellum in a limited sense. A permanent insti~
tution had been established and the rules of procedure facilitated arbitration
considerably, since such rules no longer had to be agreed upon in each case.
It has been said that
The importance of the First Hague Peace Conference lay not so much in what it
actually accomplished as in the fact that it accomplished something and that it set
a precedent for future meetings .... Earlier opinions of the work done were not
very enthusiastic, and it was only later, when the second Conference met in
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1907, that the realization gradually spread that in 1899 the first step had been
taken in the direction of international organization. 59

The Second Hague Peace Conference of 1907 reaffirmed the modest step
taken to restrict the use of force through the adoption of a new Convention for
the Pacific Settlement of Disputes (which refined the earlier convention) and a
convention which prohibited the use of force to recover public contract debts
unless arbitration had been refused (the so called Porter Convention, named
after a U.S. delegate). That these Conventions (Hague I and II) only amounted
to an extremely incomplete jus contra bellum was made clear through the adop'
tion of Convention III relative to the Opening of Hostilities, which required a
declaration of war or ultimatum before hostilities began.
Still, the first link in a chain towards a more complete non,use of force re,
gime was emerging in 1899 and 1907. The Westphalian Peace treaties had
linked together the concepts of peaceful settlement of disputes, equality of
States, non' use of force, joint action, and collective sanctions (all of which
were in some way included in the 1920 Covenant of the League of Nations and
are now ingredients in the UN system). The principle of sovereign equality of
States was implicit at the Hague Conferences, it became more explicit upon
the creation of the League of Nations (cf Article 5 of the Covenant) and today
it is enshrined in Article 2 of the UN Charter. The League Covenant marked
one step in the legal development by combining equality of States with non,use
of force. Article 10 of the Covenant contained the following wording:
The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against
external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of
all Members of the League. In case of any such aggression or in case of any threats
or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means by which
this obligation shall be fulfilled. 60

A non,binding arbitration requirement was included in Article 13 of the
Covenant. The imperfection of the Covenant system as regards non, use of
force and collective sanctions is well known and need not be explored here.
The point-at the end of this contribution-is rather, that the development
towards the UN system was underway in 1907 and 1920, and that behind this
development the Westphalian Peace agreements and the 1899 Hague
Conference played their distinctive roles-although not as indispensable
points on a continuum, but as expressions of a recurring theme in legal and
political history, as manifestations of ideas with normative potential that were
bound to have an impact on the development of intemationallaw.
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